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Explaining Homegrown Western Jihadists:
The Importance of Western Foreign Policy
Clark R. McCauley, Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania, USA
In both the United States and Europe, explanations of homegrown radicalization emphasize the power of Salafi-jihadist ideol-
ogy and Muslim experiences of discrimination and socioeconomic deprivation in Western countries. Polls of U.S. and European
Muslims, and case histories of jihadist plots for attacks in the United States, indicate that another source of homegrown radi-
calization is Western foreign policy, especially Western interventions in predominantly Muslim countries. Poll results support a
two-factor model in which seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam is predicted by both perceived discrimination and
grievance related to Western foreign policy. Consistent with this model, UK practitioners in counter-radicalization programs find
it useful to recognize Muslim grievances related to Western foreign policy in order to argue that violence does not reduce Mus-
lim suffering. These observations indicate that Muslim grievances relating to Western foreign policy are important for under -
standing and countering support for jihadist violence in Western countries.
Keywords: CVE, deradicalization, discrimination, ideology, Muslim polls, public opinion, Salafi-jihadist, radicalization, terrorism
Jihadists homegrown in Western countries are a problem and
a puzzle. Considerable ink has been spilt trying to solve this
puzzle. Not  all  experts  tell  the same story, but  there  is  a
strong tendency toward sociological explanations of jihadists
homegrown in the United States and Europe. In this paper I
argue  that  sociological  explanations  are  not  enough, that
Western foreign policies must be taken into account. 
This argument is not new. Many scholars have recognized
in general terms that terrorist violence occurs in the context
of a dynamic, action-and-reaction conflict between a state
and a non-state challenger. Notable among these scholars
are Martha Crenshaw, Fathali Moghaddam, Marc Sageman,
Tom Pyszczynski, Donatella della Porta, Sophia Moskalenko,
and  Clark  McCauley  (see  Moskalenko  and  McCauley
2017a).
Less frequent are government officials pointing to govern-
ment actions that contribute to political radicalization. Sev-
eral  British  security  officials  have  explicitly  acknowledged
that Western foreign policies are part of the explanation of ji-
hadist  terrorism (Hewitt  2017). Here is  a  salient  example
from a former director-general of the United Kingdom’s do-
mestic intelligence agency MI5.
[The invasion of Iraq] increased the terrorist threat by convin-
cing more people that Osama Bin Laden’s claim that Islam was
under attack was correct. It provided an arena for the jihad for
which he had called, so that many of his supporters, including
British citizens, travelled to Iraq to attack Western forces. It also
showed very clearly that foreign and domestic policy are inter-
twined. Actions overseas have an impact at home. And our in-
volvement in Iraq spurred some young British Muslims to turn
to terror. (Manningham-Buller 2011)
Acknowledgement of  the role of foreign policy  has been
less common in the United States, but here is an example
from the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate of 2006: “The
Iraq  conflict  has  become  the  cause  célèbre  for  jihadists,
breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Mus-
lim world and cultivating supporters for  the global jihadist
movement” (New York Times 2006).
Despite  many  academic  and  a  few  government  voices
pointing to Western foreign policies as a source of Muslim
radicalization, jihad is much more often linked with ideology
than with grievance. The combination  jihad salafi produces
4.2 million Google hits. Combining jihad with US invasion of
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Iraq or  US invasion of Afghanistan or  US support for Israel
produces  only  forty  to  seventy  thousand Google  hits—and
many of these insist that Muslim grievances are NOT impor-
tant as a driver of jihadist attacks. 
In this paper I maintain that Muslim grievances are indeed
important for understanding jihadists homegrown in Western
countries. Building on Rik Coolsaet’s analysis of homegrown
European jihadists that emphasizes contextual over ideologi-
cal causes, I suggest that the relevant context may include
Western foreign policies as well as sociological disadvantage.
Poll  results  show  that  many  Muslims, both  in  the  United
States and Europe, see the war on terrorism as a war on Is-
lam and justify suicide terrorism in defense of Islam. John
Mueller’s  case histories point to U.S. foreign policy  as the
most important incitement to jihadist violence in the United
States. Although Olivier Roy contends that European jihadists
are not to be believed when they claim Western foreign poli-
cies as grievances, I suggest how sociological discrimination
and foreign  policy  grievance  can  combine  in  a  two-factor
model of opinion radicalization. Consistent with this model,
counter-radicalization  practitioners  in  the  United  Kingdom
explicitly recognize Muslim grievances about Western foreign
policies in order to argue that jihadist violence is ineffective.
Similarly Stephanie Dornschneider’s comparison of activists
and terrorists shows the importance of arguing against vio-
lent response to grievance. My conclusion is that programs
aimed at  Countering Violent  Extremism (CVE) need to ad-
dress Muslim grievances relating to Western foreign policies.
1. Coolsaet’s Analysis
A useful review of U.S. and European views of homegrown
radicalization has been provided by Rik Coolsaet (2016, 27):
The central position the concept of radicalisation acquired in
policy, law  enforcement  and  academia  as  the  holy  grail  of
counterterrorism contributed significantly to the shift in focus
from context to individual, as Mark Sedgwick has pointed out
[2010], “the  concept  of  radicalisation  emphasizes  the  indi-
vidual and, to some extent, the ideology and the group, and
significantly de-emphasizes the wider circumstances” and the
context in which it arises.
Here I do not wish to focus on the problems of the concept
of radicalization, about which I have proposed that most of
these problems can be resolved by distinguishing between
radicalization  of  opinion  and  radicalization  of  action
(Moskalenko and McCauley 2017a). Rather I am interested
in the shift in focus from context to individual, the de-em-
phasis of the wider circumstances, that Coolsaet identifies
as occurring in both the U.S. and European views of radical-
ization. 
Coolsaet summarizes the contest between context and ide-
ology as follows:
For some, a wide array of grievances and motivations, ranging
from social marginalisation to political exclusion, had to be ad-
dressed. For others, ideology was the prime culprit. The latter
gradually became the primary prism through which the process
of turning an individual into a terrorist was examined – notwith-
standing research that indicated the secondary role of ideology
and notwithstanding the experience of many frontline preven-
tion workers, who had found that theological or ideological dis-
cussions were mostly pointless when dealing with “radicalised”
individuals. (Coolsaet 2016, 3) 
As Coolsaet sees it, radicalization came to mean accepting
ideas  of  radical  Islam,  fundamentalist  Islam,  or  jhadist
Salafism—these used interchangeably. Ideology won; context
lost. Social marginalization and political exclusion were lost
in a war of ideas against radical Islam. Residential segrega-
tion, educational  and occupational  discrimination, political
polarization against Muslim immigrants—these are ‘push’ fac-
tors for radicalization because these factors raise dissatisfac-
tion with government and lead to identification as Muslims
rather than identification as citizens of a Western country. 
What does taking context seriously mean for counter-radi-
calization?  
Better schooling, better housing, countering discrimination and
racial  hatred, job  perspectives, addressing  vulnerabilities  re-
lated to mental health or psychological difficulties, etc., have all
long since  been identified as  worthy  objectives  in  their  own
right  to create a more equal and inclusive society. (Coolsaet
2016, 41–42).
Looking  at  the  U.S. approach  to  radicalization, Coolsaet
quotes  John  Brennan,  Assistant  to  President  Obama  for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.
[A]ny  comprehensive  approach has  to  also  address  the  up-
stream factors—the conditions that help fuel violent extremism
… [A]ddressing these upstream factors is ultimately not a milit-
ary operation but a political, economic, and social campaign to
meet  the  basic  needs and legitimate  grievances  of  ordinary
people: security for their communities, education for children, a
job and income for parents, and a sense of dignity and worth.
(Coolsaet 2016, 34)
And here is Coolsaet again with a more recent summary of
where Western jihadists come from:
Today’s renewed window of opportunity offered by the collapse
of ISIS should thus be used to consolidate existing arrange-
ments and, most crucially, to enhance efforts to address the
structural drivers of radicalisation and extremism, including so-
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cial  isolation, marginalisation, and  polarisation, that  allowed
ISIS – and jihadism in general – to mobilise in the first place.
(Renard and Coolsaet, Overview and Key Findings, 5)
I agree with Coolsaet and those he quotes that the mar-
ginal sociological status of Muslim immigrants, especially in
Europe, is  an important push toward supporting and even
joining in jihadist terrorism. Marginal social status is an im-
portant part of the context that is too often ignored in the
rush to combat radical ideas among Western Muslims. But I
want to argue that sociological problems are only part of the
missing context of radicalization. Western policies in predom-
inantly Muslim countries are also important. 
To make this argument I will first show that significant num-
bers of Muslims in both the United States and Europe have
grievances with regard to Western policies in Muslim coun-
tries. Many see the war on terrorism as a war on Islam and a
non-negligible minority see suicide bombing justified in de-
fense of Islam. Then I briefly outline what U.S. jihadist terror-
ists say are their motives for violence against the West, and
examine  a  study  that  focuses  on  motives  for  violence  by
comparing Muslim activists with Muslim terrorists. Finally I
quote  UK  counter-radicalization  practitioners  to  show  the
usefulness of recognizing Western policies in Muslim coun-
tries as an important part of the context that supports radi-
calization to jihadist violence. 
2. What Do Polls Tell Us about Extremist Opinions among
U.S. Muslims?
In a series of tracking polls with U.S. Muslims, Moskalenko
and McCauley asked “Do you feel the war on terrorism is a
war  against  Islam?  (No, Not  sure/Don’t  know, Yes)  (Faj-
monova, McCauley, and Moskalenko 2017). Results show a
substantial decrease in the percent of U.S. Muslims answer-
ing ‘yes’ to this question: from 47 percent in January 2016
to  30  percent  in  June  2016  and  32  percent  in  October
2016. The reduction in extremist opinion is good news, but
the bad news is that about a third of U.S. Muslims still be-
lieve that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam.
Correlational analyses found two predictors of this belief. A
three-item index of perceived discrimination against Muslims
in  the  United  States  showed  that  respondents  perceiving
more discrimination were more likely to see a war on Islam.
Two items in the discrimination index showed substantial de-
creases between January and June. Since the 2015 terrorist
attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, have people acted as if
they are suspicious of you? (Yes 54 percent January 2016,
27 percent June 2016). Since the 2015 terrorist attacks in
Paris and San Bernardino, have you been called offensive
names? (Yes  73  percent  January  2016, 19 percent  June
2016).
One foreign policy item was also a significant  predictor:
Some people say that U.S. foreign policies are dictated by
Jewish interests. How do you feel about this?  Respondents
agreeing that U.S. foreign policies are dictated by Jewish in-
terests were more likely  to see a war  on Islam. This item
showed  a  substantial  increase  between  the  January  and
June polls (Agree 21 percent January 2016, 43 percent June
2016). 
As already noted, from January to June there was a de-
crease in the percent seeing a war on Islam (47 percent to
30 percent). Looking at the predictors of seeing a war on Is-
lam, it  appears  that  the (numerically  larger)  decreases in
perceived  discrimination  compensated  for  the  increase  in
agreement that Jewish interests dictate U.S. foreign policy, to
produce the observed decrease in the percent seeing a war
on Islam. Perhaps many U.S. Muslims expected a wave of
hostility after the Paris and San Bernardino attacks, and were
relieved to think that there must not be a war on Islam when
the wave did not appear.
The two predictors, perceiving discrimination against Mus-
lims and agreeing that U.S. foreign policies are dictated by
Jewish interests, were not consistently correlated. Taken to-
gether the results indicate that there are two sources of U.S.
Muslim opinions that there is a war on Islam: perceived dis-
crimination  at  home  and  perceived  anti-Muslim  policies
abroad.
The same tracking polls included the following item: Some
people think that suicide bombing and other forms of vio-
lence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend
Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter
what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do
you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justi-
fied, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified? 
In January, June, and October 2016, respondents answer-
ing often or sometimes justified accounted for 10, 8, and 9
percent respectively (3, 4, and 1 percent answering  often).
Again, it is good news that only a small minority see suicide
bombing against civilians as justified, but it is bad news that
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10 percent  projects  to  about  one  hundred thousand U.S.
Muslims.
Fajmonova, McCauley and Moskalenko (2017) did not find
useful predictors of justifying suicide bombing. But more re-
cent research found that alienation and depression were re-
lated  to  justifying  suicide  bombing. Respondents  high  on
alienation (social disconnection) and depression were more
likely to justify suicide bombing (Moskalenko and McCauley
2017b). Interestingly, this result parallels findings that sug-
gested a possible profile of  lone-wolf  terrorists as discon-
nected and disordered. 
3. What Do Polls Tell Us about Extremist Opinions among
European Muslims?
The first thing to notice is how few polls of European Muslims
exist, at least in the public domain. In his major review of
Muslim opinions of al-Qaeda and ISIS, including justification
of suicide bombing in defense of Islam, Alex Schmid (2017)
found a few poll results for UK Muslims but none for other
European countries.
Perhaps the best available data are not recent. In 2006
Pew Research polled  Muslims  in  four  European countries.
The  proportions  of  Muslims  who  saw suicide  bombing  of
civilians as often or sometimes justified in defense of Islam
were 16 percent in France, 15 percent in UK, 16 percent in
Spain, and  7  percent  in  Germany  (Pew  Research  Center
2006). The lower percentage in Germany may be attributable
to the fact that most German Muslim immigrants come from
Turkey, which has experienced years of PKK terrorist attacks,
including  suicide  bombing. Pew  polls  of  U.S. Muslims  in
2007  and  2011  both  found  8  percent  justifying  suicide
bombing in defense of Islam (Pew Research Center 2007,
2011).
The  same rank  ordering  of  European  countries  emerges
from a 2014 ICM poll of European Muslims. The proportions
of respondents with a favorable view of ISIS were 16 percent
in France, 7 percent in UK, and 2 percent in Germany (Grant
2014). It is interesting to note that this poll was paid for by
Russia Today.
A 2016 ICM poll asked UK Muslims about the importance
of various factors “in explaining the radicalization of Muslims
in Britain” (ICM Unlimited 2016). The highest percentage of
very important ratings—22 percent—was for “Western military
interventions  in  Syria,  Iraq  and  other  places.”  Next  was
“poverty, unemployment and lack of economic opportunity,”
with 20 percent rating this factor very important. 
In a 2015–2016 Munster University poll of ethnic Turks in
Germany, 20 percent of respondents agreed that “the threat
which the West poses to Islam justifies violence” (Pollack et
al. 2016). About three million people of Turkish origin live in
Germany; 20 percent thus represents over half a million see-
ing a Western threat to Islam.
Although there have been relatively few polls of Muslims in
European  countries, the  results  available  suggest  that  ex-
tremist opinions among European Muslims are at least as
strong as among U.S. Muslims. Only a small minority support
jihadist terrorism – but even 5 percent projects to over one
million of Europe’s 26 million Muslims (Pew Research Center
2017). The perception of a Western threat to Islam, and the
concern about Western interventions in Iraq and Syria, to-
gether  indicate  that  European  foreign  policies  relating  to
Muslim countries may play a role in the development of radi-
cal opinions and radical actions among Western Muslims.
4. What Do U.S. Jihadists Say about their Motivations for 
Violence?
John Mueller  has collated  descriptions  of  all  cases  of  Is-
lamist  extremist  attacks  targeting  the  United  States, from
9/11  through  2017. He  includes  attempted  attacks, dis-
rupted plots to attack, and plots that might have led to an
attack. In sixteen years, the total number of cases is 117.
Based on the details of the cases available in the public
record, Mueller has assessed the motivations of the actors
involved. He discusses the results in his introduction to the
cases, in a section titled Motivations: It’s the Foreign Policy,
Stupid.
There were a few cases in which it could probably be said there
was no notable motivation at all (Cases 5, 10, 19). However, in
almost all the other cases, the overwhelming driving force was
simmering, and more commonly boiling, outrage at American
foreign policy—the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular
and also the country’s support for Israel in the Palestinian con-
flict. Religion was a key part of the consideration for most, but
it was not that they had a burning urge to spread Islam and
Sharia law or to establish caliphates. Rather it was the desire
to protect the religion against what was commonly seen to be a
concentrated  war  upon  it  in  the  Middle  East  by  the  United
States government and military. (Mueller 2018, 10)
This conclusion fits the summary of the jihadist narrative
developed by David Betz (2008, 520) from a review of ji-
hadist texts.
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(1) Islam is  under  general  unjust  attack  by  Western
crusaders led by the United States;
(2) Jihadis, whom the West refers to as “terrorists,” are
defending against this attack;
(3) the actions they take in defence of Islam are pro-
portionally  just  and  religiously  sanctified;  and,
therefore
(4) it is the duty of good Muslims to support these ac-
tions.
This is a narrative rather than an ideology; it justifies terror-
ism, as Mueller notes, without recourse to religious authority
or quotations from the Koran. Religion enters the narrative
only insofar as caring about what happens to Muslims, car-
ing about Muslims as victims of Western attack, justifies de-
fensive or revenge violence. This narrative is also consistent
with  Sageman’s  characterization  of  terrorists  as  self-pro-
claimed  soldiers  who  engage  in  violence  to  defend  and
avenge their community (see below).
5. Roy’s Analysis and a Re-interpretation
In contrast with Mueller, some analysts believe that Western
policies with regard to Muslim countries have little or nothing
to do with the motivations of homegrown Western jihadists.
Olivier Roy is a prominent example. Here is his summary de-
scription of homegrown terrorists in France.
[T]he typical radical is a young second-generation immigrant or
convert, very  often  involved in  episodes of  petty  crime, with
practically no religious education, but having a rapid and recent
trajectory of conversion/reconversion, more often in the frame-
work of a group of friends or over the internet than in the con-
text of a mosque; the embrace of religion is seldom kept secret
(no  taqiyya, or  dissimulation), but  rather  is  exhibited, but  it
does not necessarily correspond to immersion in religious prac-
tice. (Roy 2017, 32)
Like others, Roy uses the prevalence of second-generation
immigrants and converts to argue that Islamist radicals lack
connection with any Muslim country. But his next step is star-
tling. He argues that radicals are not moved to violence by
the  suffering  of  Muslims  in  Palestine  or  Afghanistan—be-
cause they do not try to go to these countries to fight. In-
stead  they  cite  the  vague  and  abstract  suffering  of  the
ummah—Muslims around the world—and try to join or fight
for Islamic State. This observation leads Roy to conclude that
it is “the internal causes of radicalization that must be stud-
ied” (39). For Roy, a youthful obsession with death is per-
haps the most salient internal cause.
In this argument Roy cites his debate with Francois Burgat. 
… Francois Burgat’s objection that  radicals are motivated by
the “suffering” experienced by Muslims who were formerly col-
onized, or as victims of racism or any other sort of discrimina-
tion, U.S. bombardments, drones, Orientalism, and so on, would
imply that the revolt is primarily led by victims. But the relation-
ship between radicals and victims is more imaginary than real.
Those who perpetrate attacks in Europe are not inhabitants of
the Gaza Strip, or Libyans, or Afghans. They are not necessarily
the poorest, the most humiliated, or the least integrated. The
fact that 25 percent of jihadis are converts shows that the link
between radicals and their “people” is also in realm of the ima-
ginary, or  at  least—as  I  argue—an imaginary  construct. (Roy
2017, 9)
A psychologist would have no difficulty seeing identification
with a victim group as a cause of radicalization, even for an
individual not personally victimized. Similarly there is no diffi-
culty in seeing identification as a subjective or “imaginary”
cause rather than an objective cause. Objective facts do not
determine human behavior, perceptions do. 
Furthermore, our analysis can do without positing fascina-
tion  with  death. Many  young  Muslims  living  in  European
countries feel the pain of discrimination; even individuals ex-
periencing educational and occupational success can iden-
tify with the suffering of other Muslims in Europe. Europeans
do not differentiate immigrants from the Mahgreb, the Middle
East, or South Asia; all are lumped as Muslims. Second-gen-
eration and convert Muslims in Europe have weak ties with
any Muslim country; if they are not French, Belgian, Dutch or
German, who are they? They must be, as they are seen and
treated, simply Muslims. Thus it is discrimination in a West-
ern country that leads second-generation and convert Mus-
lims to identify with the ummah rather than with any particu-
lar Muslim country.
But the ummah is suffering. Photographs, videos, and sto-
ries provide vivid examples of their suffering and humiliation.
Roy does not fail to notice this; he points to the popularity of
videos  such  as  “Wake  Up  Ummah” (2017, 45;  https://  - 
www.you  tube.com/watch?v=POL8CLBaBNU  ). The personal of
discrimination becomes the political of avenging the ummah.
An individual zero becomes an avenging hero. 
This analysis is close to one of Roy’s summary passages,
despite  his  announced  intention  to  focus  on  “internal
causes”: 
The engagement in violent action thus has to do with making
the connection between a personal revolt, rooted in a feeling of
humiliation due to one’s attachment to a virtual “community” of
believers, and a metanarrative of returning to the golden age of
Islam, a narrative theatricalized according to  the codes of  a
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contemporary aesthetics of violence that turns the youth into a
hero. (2017, 73)
Whereas Roy wants to stop at “internal causes,” including
perceived discrimination and fascination with death, my al-
ternative is that discrimination at home and Western foreign
policies are both contextual factors—not necessarily facts but
at least perceptions—that contribute to radicalization. 
Discrimination at home is not only a grievance in itself, it
pushes toward identification with a global ummah, and the
perceived suffering  of  the  ummah in  turn  produces  addi-
tional feelings of grievance and outrage. Grievances related
to discrimination thus join with grievances related to Western
foreign policies to fuel radicalization of both ideas and ac-
tions. Identification with the ummah is indeed imaginary, in
the  sense  of  Benedict  Anderson’s  Imagined  Communities
(1983), but the power of identification in political conflict is
all too real (McCauley 2001).
This  two-factor  model of  radicalization is  consistent  with
U.S. polling  results  cited  earlier  that  show that  both  per-
ceived discrimination and perceived Jewish control  of  U.S.
foreign policy are linked with seeing the war on terrorism as
a war on Islam. The model is reinforced by polling results
showing that  Western interventions in the Middle East  are
seen as the most important explanation of radicalization of
UK Muslims, as well as by results showing that a significant
minority of Turkish-Germans believe that the Western threat
to Islam justifies violence. Also consistent with the model is
Mueller’s finding that the predominant motivation of U.S. ji-
hadists is outrage against U.S. foreign policy toward Muslim
countries.
It is important to note that the two-factor model offers a
very different view of the importance of ideology than that
usually represented in concerns about Salafi-jihadist Islam
as the source of  terrorist  attacks  (for  recent  example see
Tony Blair Institute for Global Change 2018). Islam as ideol-
ogy is not important; the Koran and its interpretation are not
important. Identification with the sufferings of the Ummah is
the key to justifying violence. 
6. What Do We Know about the Difference between 
Muslim Activists and Muslim Terrorists?
A more precise understanding of jihadist motives can be de-
veloped from comparison of the motives of Muslim terrorists
with  the motives  of  Muslim activists. This  crucial  question
has seldom been posed empirically. We have many studies of
terrorists, often in their own words: interviews with current or
former terrorists asking about their motives and their trajec-
tories into terrorism. What is even more useful is to try to dis-
tinguish terrorists from activists with the same cause. Some
individuals with a political grievance will use violence, while
others with the same grievance will use legal or at least non-
violent forms of protest and political mobilization. The great
advantage of comparing terrorists with activists is the possi-
bility of learning, not how some people are moved to action,
but how some people are moved to violent action—terrorism.
From his  study  of  thirty-four  campaigns  of  political  vio-
lence, from the French Revolution to jihadist terrorism, Sage-
man derived a model in which a political protest community
produces self-proclaimed soldiers who engage in violence to
defend and avenge their community (Sageman 2017). The
transition from protest to violence occurs, according to Sage-
man, where the conflict between community and state esca-
lates as both sides increase their use of physical violence
and a rhetoric  of total war. On both sides, disillusionment
with non-violent tactics and moral outrage at enemy violence
contribute to the escalation of violence.
This model points to the escalating dynamics of intergroup
conflict as the source of intergroup violence (see my intro-
ductory paragraphs for others taking a dynamic view). Sage-
man believes that state escalation of moral rhetoric and vio-
lence contributes to the emergence of terrorist violence, and
suggests that the state should avoid over-reactions that can
turn non-violent activists to terrorism. But his model does not
offer much help in explaining why some activists move to ter-
rorism while at the same time and under the same circum-
stances, other activists remain non-violent actors. Nor does
his model help us understand how some individuals move to
terrorism without having tried activism.
Here is where a remarkable study can help us: a compari-
son of activists and terrorists for the same cause. In long in-
terviews, Dornschneider (2016) probed the motives of non-
violent Islamist activists of the 1980s (Muslim Brotherhood)
and former Islamist terrorists (al-Jama’at al Islamiyya, al-Ji-
had) in Egypt. She did the same for 1970s left-wing activists
(Socialist German Student Union, Kommune 1) and terrorists
(Red Army Faction, 2 June Movement) in Germany. Most of
Dornschneider’s interviewees were still living in hiding during
the period of her research (2009–2010). It is a testimony to
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her persistence and her social skills in both Arabic and Ger-
man that she was able to interview twenty-seven individuals:
eight Egyptian activists, seven Egyptian former terrorists, six
German activists, and six  German former terrorists. Overall
Dornschneider  presents  a  double  paired  comparison:  ac-
tivists vs terrorists for both Egyptian Islamists and German
leftists.
The first  result  of  interest  is  that  activists  and terrorists
both see the state as aggressive and repressive; they have
the same grievance. This result argues against a war of ideas
that tries to encourage ‘moderate’ activism by teaching more
positive views of the state.
Terrorists are more likely than activists to believe that non-
violent action will not change the state, but violence can. Ter-
rorists are also more likely to believe that the state cannot
be improved, that it must be transformed. Finally, terrorists
are more willing to accept the negative consequences of vio-
lence, both the suffering of those they attack and their own
suffering as targets of state power. 
In contrast, non-violent activists are more likely than terror-
ists  to  believe that  violence  cannot  reduce state  injustice
and oppression, and that violence will bring negative conse-
quences to those who fight the state. Activists are also more
likely to believe that state structures are essential to avoid
chaos even when the state is abusive, and to believe that
those suffering socio-economic deprivation can be helped by
activism.
Following Dornschneider, it is interesting to note that socio-
economic deprivation under an unjust and repressive state
can motivate non-violent  activism but  does not  appear  to
motivate terrorist violence. This result resonates with research
showing that  low socio-economic  status  is  not  usually  re-
lated to becoming a terrorist.
But the key message from this research is the potential for
using the differences between terrorists and activists to in-
form programs that try to turn Muslims away from violence
and  terrorism. Terrorists  and  activists  agree  in  perceiving
state aggression and repression as their major motive and
justification for action. They differ in other beliefs. Arguments
against terrorism should focus on these beliefs. Against ter-
rorism it can be argued that 1) violence only strengthens the
state; 2) improving the state is easier than transforming it; 3)
violence brings morally unacceptable suffering to innocents
on both sides of a conflict; 4) violence brings chaos to those
who most  depend on state structures for  support;  and 5)
nonviolent activism can reduce socio-economic deprivation.
Similar arguments have been advanced by Sedgwick (2011),
who suggested that arguing against violence is more likely to
succeed than arguing against grievances shared by millions
of Muslims.
7. An Example of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 
that Uses These Arguments
Between 9/11, 2001, and 2017, there were about 3,500 ar-
rests for terrorism-related offences in the United Kingdom.
About 80 percent of these were for international terrorism (ji-
hadist) offenses. Only 646 of these arrests resulted in con-
viction  for  a  terrorism-related  offense. Of  those convicted,
186 terrorism or extremism prisoners were still being held in
prison as of March 2017 (Dempsey and Allen 2017).
From these figures we learn that 460 individuals impris-
oned for terrorism-related offenses after 9/11 have already
been released (646 minus 186). A further implication is that
most of the offenses were relatively minor, because terrorists
convicted of murder or attempted murder get long sentences.
So those released were mostly guilty of supporting terrorism
in ways that did not include violence (money or other mate-
rial  support, hate  speech). After  relatively  brief  periods  in
prison, then, 460 individuals convicted of terrorism-related
offenses—the  great  majority  jihadist-related  offenders—be-
came prospects for deradicalization.  
Deradicalization  of  individuals  convicted  of  terrorist  of-
fenses in the United Kingdom is in the hands of probation
officers, often working with community groups that try to pro-
vide support and mentoring for probationers. Sarah Marsden
(2017) has interviewed more than thirty of these frontline
de-rad workers to learn what they do and what they think
works. The results are interview excerpts rather than statistics
about success and failure.
As suggested earlier, the radicalizing issue for many proba-
tioners is  foreign policy. Here is  a senior  probation officer
talking:
Social exclusion, racism, things like that, you know, diversity’s a
big part of it, foreign policy, perceived injustice, and grievance
… grievance is an important part, foreign policy, it’s about the
impact factors, that people are seeing Muslim children dying on
the TV, these can have big impacts on people. (Marsden 2017,
99) 
IJCV: Vol. 12/2018
McCauley: Explaining Homegrown Western Jihadists: The Importance of Western Foreign Policy 8
One notable finding of the interviews is that probation offi-
cers and community mentors report some success with inter-
ventions that do not directly challenge jihadist ideas. Instead
interventions aim for disengagement and desistence by de-
bating not the grievance but the violent response to griev-
ance. Here is a community mentor talking: 
… if they want to talk about foreign policy, we’ll just join their
argument, you know, I think you’re right about Afghanistan or
Iraq, why should other people go into Afghanistan or Iraq and
kill  innocent  people, they’ve  no right  to  go there—yes you’re
right. So then these people start thinking, well hang on we’ve
got the same views, at the end then, when the conversation fin-
ishes on that particular subject, what we have both agreed is
that, yes, we don’t like it what’s happening, but what is the ac-
tion we can take, to stop that from happening? (63)
This kind of intervention may be particularly helpful with in-
dividuals  who strongly  feel  the  suffering  of  others. Rather
than  insist  the  probationer  deny  Western  victimization  of
Muslims, or deny that this suffering justifies violence in re-
turn, the debate turns on whether violence or support for vio-
lence is the most effective response to Muslim grievances.
A probation officer reflects on the limits of the possible in
deradicalization:
He’s always gonna have strong political beliefs, that’s the way
he is, and he’s got a really strong sense of injustice, but I think
what he’s learned now, is that he can’t channel those in the way
he was. (100)
It seems that UK probation officers have discovered some
of the arguments against political violence that Dornschnei-
der identified in her interviews. This kind of convergence is
always heartening, and the key to the convergence is recog-
nizing the political  grievances of Western Muslims that are
based in Western foreign policies.
8. Conclusion
As described in this paper, several observations suggest the
importance of Western foreign policies for understanding how
a very few Western Muslims become involved in jihad in Syria
or terrorist  violence at  home. Many Western Muslims, per-
haps about one third, believe that the war on terrorism is a
war on Islam. A small minority, perhaps about 10 percent,
see suicide bombing against civilians as justified in defense
of Islam. UK Muslims believe that Western foreign policies in
the Middle East are the most important explanation of Mus-
lim radicalization; one fifth of German Muslims of Turkish ori-
gin believe that the Western threat to Islam justifies violence.
It is possible that these broad Muslim perceptions of threat
to Islam and justifications of violence in defense of Islam are
irrelevant to explaining jihadist terrorism. There are at least a
hundred Western Muslims with radical opinions for every one
who plans or attempts violent action. Perhaps jihadist terror-
ists are motivated by something else, perhaps by the Salafi-
jihadist  ideology  that  is  often  cited  as  source  of  jihadist
threats.
But is this plausible? Who can hope to be a hero without
an audience sympathizing with the cause the hero acts for
and the actions the hero takes? Could a young Muslim hope
to move from zero to hero in jihadist violence if there were no
audience  perceiving  a  Western  threat  to  Islam? Could  he
hope to be a hero if the admiring audience for jihad were
only a few Salafi-jihadist Muslims? 
It is sobering to realize that we have currently no theory re-
lating the distribution of radical opinions with the distribution
of extremist violence. If the percentage of Western Muslims
who see the war on terrorism as a war on Islam were cut in
half, perhaps from 40 percent to 20 percent, there is as yet
no  theory  to  tell  us  whether  jihadist  violence  by  Western
Muslims would decline, or stay the same, or even increase. 
Perhaps decreasing mass support  would reduce terrorist
capacity or willingness to use violence, and attacks wwould
decrease. Perhaps decreasing mass support would give ter-
rorists  a  feeling  of  now-or-never  desperation, and  attacks
would increase. Perhaps decreasing mass support is irrele-
vant for committed terrorists, who would continue their  at-
tacks unchanged, at least in the short term. 
So far as I am aware, there is no research that has tried to
evaluate all three possibilities. There is at least one case that
supports the idea that decreasing mass radicalization brings
a decrease in terrorist attacks. Merari (2010) used polling
data to show a new high in Palestinian support for terrorist
attacks on Israelis after Ariel Sharon led Israeli police onto
the Temple Mount; in parallel, Palestinian suicide attacks on
Israelis increased to a new high (Second Intifada). In 2004,
after the death of Yassir Arafat, Palestinian support for sui-
cide attacks declined and so did attacks on Israelis.
Is there a causal relation between support for attacks and
the number of attacks? The data do not directly support this
conclusion, as mass opinion and attacks changed in parallel
but opinion change did not lead change in attacks. The clos-
est to causal evidence from Merari is a series of quotes from
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Palestinian  terrorists  in  Israeli  prisons  who  said  that  they
would not organize suicide attacks if Palestinians do not sup-
port such attacks. 
Merari  argues  that  public  support  for  suicide  attacks  is
necessary but not sufficient to support a campaign of such
attacks. A community feeling of existential threat, encourage-
ment of suicide attacks by media and authority figures, and
an organization that provides the means and opportunity for
attack are also necessary (Merari 2010, 183). In support of
the latter factor, Merari notes that only four Palestinian sui-
cide terrorists acted on their own “whim,” while the great ma-
jority were deployed by a militant organization. 
Merari’s three conditions do not explain who, of the many
Muslims perceiving existential threat to Islam and authorita-
tive encouragement of violence, will move to violent action.
Moskalenko and McCauley (2017a) have argued that radical
opinion and radical action are two separate problems, involv-
ing different psychological mechanisms. At the action level,
individuals join a militant group for many reasons; in addi-
tion to political grievance, these include personal grievance,
a slippery slope of slowly increasing commitment, love for an
existing militant, status-seeking, new comrades after  social
disconnection, and escape from life problems.  
Four of these reasons can move an individual to violent ac-
tion without the help of a militant group: political grievance,
personal  grievance,  status-seeking,  and  escape  from  life
problems. These reasons may be particularly important for
homegrown  Western  jihadists,  many  of  whom  perpetrate
lone-actor attacks.
Thus there are many factors, at individual, group and mass
levels, that can move Western Muslims toward a homegrown
terrorist attack. Muslim grievances related to Western foreign
policies are not a sufficient explanation of jihadist attacks.
But  mass-level  grievances may still  be important, perhaps
even  necessary  as  Merari  suggests  in  relation  to  suicide
bombers, for  understanding homegrown jihadist  attacks  in
Western countries. 
Ignoring the contribution of Western foreign policies to ji-
hadist violence has at least one important cost. We are left
with Salafi-jihadi ideology, or perhaps jihadist ideology and
anti-Muslim discrimination, as the target for CVE programs.
CVE mentors in the United Kingdom have found it useful to
acknowledge Western victimization of Muslims in order to ar-
gue against violence as a useful response to this victimiza-
tion. This argument is out of reach for those who deny that
Western foreign policies are an important part of the justifi-
cation for jihadist violence. 
In sum, polling data show that many Muslims in the United
States and Europe perceive a Western war on Islam and jus-
tify suicide bombing in defense of Islam. There is good rea-
son to believe that these opinions offer important support for
homegrown jihadist  attacks in Western countries, and that
this  support  depends both  on perceived discrimination at
home  and  outrage  at  Western  policies  abroad.  Success
against homegrown Muslim extremism will  require focusing
on both factors. Explicit  recognition of foreign policy griev-
ances may be particularly useful for CVE programs, offering a
double  advantage.  Recognition  avoids  difficult  arguments
against grievances shared by many Muslims, and opens the
door  to  easier  arguments  against  violence  targeting  inno-
cents—the arguments that  distinguish  activists from terror-
ists. 
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